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Supertorm Sandy, the 2008 Iowa floods, and Huricanes Katrna and Rita all supply
recent reminders that US. cities can no longer adopt an ad hoc approach to thrats presented by
climate change and natural hazards The stories detailing long-term recovery from these
disasters underscore that federal, state, and local governments are struggling to appreciate the
legal tools and institutions necessary to implement the large-scale inrstructure, housing, and
community development programs that climate change and more frequent natural disasters
demand This Article calls for development of a tool allowing succinct evaluation of the range
of community capacities that will figzur critically in the implementation of long-term disaster
recovery efforts On completion, tis assessment tool will provide a "snapshot" of a local
government's resiliency-its capacity to address and bounce back from disaster-related
challenges. Building on recent environmental, land use, and local government law scholarsp,
this Article jecommends creation of, and outlines several key indicators for, a City Resilience
Index (CRI). The CR! evaluates cities'legal resoures, focusing on whether a local government
possesses the necessary legal and institutional "toolkit" to pursue redevelopment imtiatives
essential to managing the challenges presented by natural hazards and climate change.
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I. INTRODUCTION
August 2015 marked Hurricane Katrina's tenth anniversary.1
Many believe New Orleans has turned the comer to a full recovery
from the storm's devastation.2 Some believe that a complete recovery
is still years away. But very few would disagree that the city's
recovery unfolded far too slowly.'
1. See generally DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRCANE KATRINA,
NEW ORLEANS, AND THE NMississiPi GULF COAST 129-35 (2006) (detailing Hurricane
Katrina's August 29, 2005, landfall).
2. See, e.g., Stacey Plaisance, 8 Years After Hurricane Kamna, The City of New
Orleans on the Rebound HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2013/08/29/
after-hurricane-katrina-new-orleans n 3836108.html (last updated Oct. 29, 2013, 5:12 AM)
(detailing the neighborhood rebuilding efforts and government-led flood protection and
revitalization projects that the city's leadership believe have set a new course for New
Orleans).
3. See, e.g., Nathan Kensinger, Tracing Post-Storm Recovery in New York and New
Orleans, CURBED N.Y. (Jan. 22, 2015), bttp://ny.curbed.com/archives/2015/01/22/tracing-post
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It took two years for federal funds intended to support long-term
neighborhood and community development projects to reach the City
of New Orleans! To make matters worse, it took two more years for
the local government, stymied by missing or under-resourced public
agencies and shortsighted legal requirements, to begin spending those
federal dollars on neighborhood revitalization projects.6 The delay
translated directly into what can be described only as a frustratingly
slow start to the city's long-term recovery.
The recovery's anemic start represents much more than an
indictment of poor local, state, and federal action. The delay also had
profound human and economic consequences.' While waiting for
recovery to unfold, some families gave up plans to return home.'
stormrecovery-itnew.york-and new_orleans.php (documenting, through a photo essay,
that "[the city's] recovery is far from complete" ten years after Katrina).
4. But see Robert Olshansky, Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, Address at the
Third International Conference on Urban Disaster Reduction (Sept. 30, 2014) (contending
that a slow urban housing recovery postdisaster may be good for a city's redevelopment).
5. See Patrik Jonsson, Pr'vate Dollars Leading Recovery of New Orleans,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 27, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0627/p0ls06-
usec.html (reporting that as of twenty-two months after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the
City of New Orleans had not received any federal funds to promote neighborhood recovery).
This Article focuses on obstacles to long-term recovery from crisis and disaster at the local
and state levels. Another topic that is in need of attention, but beyond the scope of this
Article, involves the impediments associated with federal involvement in long-term recovery
from crisis and disaster. The impediments associated with federal involvement have recently
received close attention from the federal government and from commentators. See, e.g., John
Travis Marshall, Weathering NEPA Review- Superstorms and Super Slow Urban Recovery,
41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 81 (2014); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Hurricane
Sandy Rebuilding Task Force Releases Rebuilding Strategy (Aug. 19, 2013), http://portal.
hud.gov/hudportal/lllJD?src=/press/press -releases mediaadvisories/2013/HUDNo. 13-125.
6. See Kalima Rose & Laura Tuggle, CommunityAction: Bringing People Home to
Stronger Neighborhoods, COMMUNITY-WEALTH.ORG 2-4 (Aug. 2010), http://community-
wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/paper-rose-tuggle.pdf
(explaining that the City of New Orleans' pre-Katrina problem of ineffectively using federal
grant funds foretold the city's poststorm struggles to deliver federal aid to flooded
neighborhoods).
7. See Sandie McCarthy-Brown & Susan L. Waysdorf, Katrina Disaster Family
Law The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Families and Family Law, 42 IND. L. REv. 721,
728, 736-38 (2009) (describing the fundamental challenges of housing New Orleans' families
four years after Katrina as a persisting and "critical humanitarian, social, economic, political,
and legal problem"); cf Craig E. Pollack & Julia E Lynch, Foreclosures Are Killing Us, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/opinion/foreclosures-are-killing-
us.html?_r=0 (describing the impact of the mortgage foreclosure crisis on individuals and
neighborhoods, emphasizing that "[l]osing a home disrupts social ties to neighbors, schools,
jobs and health care providers-ties that under better circumstances promote good health"-
and concluding that "[n]eighborhoods suffer, not just homeowners").
8. Jonathan Tilove, Five Years After Hurricane Katina, 100,000 New Orleanians
Have Yet To Return, NOLA.cOM (Aug. 24, 2010, 9:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/katrina/
index.ssf/2010/08/five-years-afterhurricanekat.html.
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Those who moved back to New Orleans found neighborhoods still
struggling to recover.! Their homes were sandwiched between vacant
houses and empty lots that had morphed into 40' x 100' slices of
overgrown subtropical jungle.'"
There were many factors that contributed to the recovery's glacial
pace: federal regulations unsuited for major urban disasters," a local
government that lacked essential administrative capacity,'2 political
infighting from Washington D.C. to Baton Rouge to City Hall,'3 an
episodic recovery planning process that had to unfold before federal
funds could be dispensed,' and federal funding regulations that proved
difficult to reconcile with the exigencies of disaster recovery.'5 New
Orleans' tragedy, and the cautionary tale for its sister U.S. cities, is that
9. Charles Maldonado, hn Parts ofNew Orleans, Eyesores Remain on City' List of
Fixed-Up Properties, LENS (June 24, 2014, 12:41 PM), http://thelensnola.org/2014/06/24/in-
some-parts-of-new-orleans-eyesores-remain-on-citys-list-of-fixed-up-properties/. The author
surveyed neighborhoods that residents considered "beautiful" before Katrina; however, now
"only a few houses are inhabited, and the others are falling apart' creating "an eyesore" to
the residents who have returned home. Id.
10. See id.
11. Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Preliminary Observations on Progress to Date and
Challenges for the Future: Heaing Before the Subcomm. on Disaster Recovery of the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & GovernmentalAffairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Donna
Fraiche, Member of the Board, Louisiana Recovery Authority) (describing the fundamental
adversities that the State of Louisiana encountered in administering the FEMA Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program); see Marshall, supra note 5, at 83.
12. See Transition New Orleans Task Force, Housing 19 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished
report) (on file with author) ("City agencies, both within and outside City Hall, are not
currently staffed to operate quickly and efficiently"). For their part, City of New Orleans
officials also cast blame on state and federal partners. See Wayne Curtis, The Savior ofNew
Orleans, ARCHITECT MAG. (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.architectmagazine.com/educational-
projects/the-savior-of-new-orleans.aspx (describing the frustration of the director of the city's
Office of Recovery Management with the State of Louisiana's and the federal government's
level of competence in administering recovery programs).
13. See ROBERT B. OLSHANSKY & LAURIE A. JOHNSON, CLEAR AS MUD: PLANNING
FOR THE REBUILDING OF NEW ORLEANS 23-25 (2010) (recounting that the Bush Admini-
stration focused on redirecting blame to state and local actors, rather than putting the long-
term recovery on track); BRINKLEY, supra note 1, at 531-32 (quoting New Orleans Mayor C.
Ray Nagin's desperate statements that he had "no idea what [President George W. Bush and
Governor Kathleen Blanco are] doing" and that "God is looking down on all this, and if they
are not doing everything in their power.., they are going to pay the price").
14. See OLSHANSKY & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 37-71 (detailing the City of New
Orleans' extended effort to craft a plan for rebuilding the city).
15. See Memorandum from Flozell Daniels, President & Chief Exec. Officer, La.
Disaster Recovery Found., and Albert Ruesga, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Greater New
Orleans Found., to Melody Barnes, Dir., Domestic Policy Council et al. 6 (Aug. 17, 2009),
http://mrbf.org/sites/default/files/imagesIblog/nola as-a-modelcity.pdf (explaining that the
long-term recovery process was impeded by complicated regulations and the difficulty in
coordinating local, state, and federal actors).
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almost all of these impediments to a quicker recovery could have been
anticipated and avoided.
Cities, states, and the federal government cannot afford to let
lessons learned from Katrina's troubled long-term recovery escape
analysis.16 The stakes associated with carrying out a city's long-term
recovery efforts are high, and without improved management at the
city, state, and federal levels, they are bound to be costly.7 Good
management of a city's long-term recovery directly influences the lives
of people across an entire region.'8 Particularly vulnerable are
individuals and families that disaster leaves without homes or jobs or
whose life's savings it depletes."
Effective management is also important because it is fiscally
careless to execute long-term recovery inefficiently." The federal
16. See Joseph Tanfani, Since Sandy, a Storm Pattern of Costly Stumbles in New
Jersey, L.A. TIMEs (June 20, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-disaster-
recovery-20140620-story.html#page=l (observing that "there is no playbook for recovery"
and detailing how, even following the well-known recovery difficulties after Hurricanes
Katrina and Ike, the State of New Jersey paid private consultants hundreds of millions of
dollars to implement recovery programs, despite the fact that those consultants had received
mixed reviews for their work in the preceding Gulf Coast hurricane recoveries); Lukas
Sundermann et al., Mind the Risk: A Global Ranking of Cities Under Threat from Natural
Disasters, Swiss RE 1, 26 (2014), http://media.swissre.com/documents/SwissReMind_
therisk.pdf (detailing that many of the world's major cities are located in coastal areas and
explaining that the "loss potential in [these] urban areas is high and rising").
17. See James W Fossett, Lets Stop Improvising Disaster Recovery, NELSON A.
ROCKEFELLER INST. GOv'T (July 2013), http://www.rockinst.org/observations/fossettj/2013-
07-09-ImprovisingDisasterRecovery.aspx (describing generally what economists call the
high "welfare cost" associated with government-led recoveries and observing that these costs
are difficult to estimate with precision, but are "surely large").
18. See Sundermann et al., supra note 16, at 6, 26 (presenting findings regarding the
potential effects of natural disasters on particular cities and evaluating the effect such a
disaster would have on the entire metropolitan region and its economy).
19. After their homes have been substantially damaged by a disaster event, families
often wait many months for government assistance to help fill the large financial gaps
hindering a family's ability to pay for recovery. See Patrick McGeehan & Griff Palmer,
Displaced by Hurricane Sandy, and Living in Limbo, N.Y TiMEs (Dec. 6, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/07/nyregion/displaced-by-hurricane-sandy-and-living-in-limbo-
instead-of-at-home.htmlpagewanted=all&_r=0. These displaced families live with relatives,
"drain their savings," and face the reality of transitioning "from having a comfortable lifestyle
to being totally in debt." Id. Those without resources before a disaster face even tougher
circumstances. As Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated, many Louisiana and New
Orleans families were left in peril following the storm because of significant levels of
preexisting poverty. See Dominique Duval-Diop & Kalima Rose, Delivering Equitable
Development to a Recovering Louisiana: A State Policy Guide for 2008 and Beyond PoL'Y
ARcHivE 1 (2008), http://research.policyarchive.org/13692.pdf.
20. Beginning in 1993 with long-term recovery relief from Hurricane Andrew and
continuing through Hurricane Sandy in 2012, the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) has dispersed approximately $40 billion in congressional
appropriation of disaster Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). See Antoinette
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government has spent tens of billions of dollars on long-term recovery
since 9/11.1 In a time of tightening federal budgets and competing
demands for limited federal resources, it is critical that the federal
government take every step to ensure these recovery funds are spent in
a way that maximizes the impact of every dollar appropriated.
There is another, more future-focused, reason it is important to
analyze the efficacy of long-term recovery. Evidence suggests we are
wading deeper into an era of climate change and sea level rise.22 If
Katrina, Rita, Irene, and Sandy are any confirmation of these
fundamental impending challenges to our cities, then we can expect
long-term metropolitan recovery to be a "growth industry" for
governments in the coming years and decades. We cannot afford to
waste the lessons learned from New Orleans' long-term recovery.
The last decade's experience with catastrophic storms has taught
us that an arduous long-term recovery is not just a New Orleans
phenomenon.23 Recent reports suggest that the recovery in New
Jersey24 and New York City 5 is afflicted by some of the same problems
M. Jackson, Federal Funding and Financing Programs Post-Disaster, in BUILDING
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE POST-DISASTER 3, 10-11 (Dorcas R. Gilmore & Diane M. Standaert
eds., 2013).
21. More than $38 billion in disaster CDBG funds have been appropriated since 2001
and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. See id.
22. See, e.g., Wendy Koch, Global Warming Ground Zero; Rising Sea Levels Put
'Tillions ofDollars'at Risk, USA TODAY, May 8, 2014, at 3A (citing the National Climate
Assessment, which estimates that sea levels are "most likely to rise another 1 to 4 feet by
2100"); Kia Gregory & Marc Santora, Bloomberg Outlines $20 Billion Storm Protection
Plan, N.Y. TIMEs (June 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/nyregion/bloomberg-
outlines-20-billion-plan-to-protect-city-from-future-storms.html.
23. See Heather Haddon, Irene Impact Lingers, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203833104577070761269639868 (noting
that the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management spokesperson expected that the
Tropical Storm Irene recovery "could take months"); Hurricane Sandy and New Jersey
Poor, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/opinion/hurricane-
sandy-and-new-jerseys-poor.html (discussing a complaint filed with the HUD "charging that
the state plan for distributing Hurricane Sandy recovery aid discriminated against blacks and
Hispanics who lost their homes in the storm"); Joe Nocera, Rebuilding on Their Own N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/opinion/nocera-rebuilding-on-
their-own.html (speculating that the Sandy recovery will advance mainly through the efforts
of private residents); Romy Varghese, Springsteen Girls Priced Out as Rich Buy NJ Shore
Homes, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2014, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-11-10/springsteen-girls-priced-out-as-rich-buy-n-j-shore-homes ("[Those relying on
insurance claims and government grants are sometimes unable to rebuild as quickly as their
wealthier neighbors.").
24. See, e.g., Tanfani, supra note 16.
25. See, e.g., Russ Buettner & David W Chen, Huricane Sandy Recovery Progiam
in New York Ciy Was Mired by Its Design, N.Y TtMEs (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/09/05/nyregion/after-hurricane-sandy-a-rebuilding-program-is-hindered-by-its-
own-construction.html?_r-0 (describing the City of New York's twenty-one-month delay in
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that compromised New Orleans' recovery. The billion-dollar, long-
term recovery programs rolled out following Hurricane Sandy are, in
significant instances, lacking in their management, transparency, and
fairness in ways that echo problems experienced during the recovery
from Katrina.2' Although program management, transparency, and
fairness are topics that all deserve their own extended analysis, the
takeaway is that federal, state, and local governments need to work




Until now, the federal government has been paying for long-term
disaster recoveries that move slowly and produce mixed results.28 It is
time we not only examine the reasons for the generally low-
functioning federal-state-local long-term recovery partnership but also
isolate key factors that seem to contribute to sluggish long-term
recoveries.
This Article commences this process with an examination of the
local governmental legal landscape. It explores the ways in which
local ordinances and governmental institutions, as well as state statutes
and constitutions, influence a city's recovery. The goal is to identify
examples of legal and institutional efficiency and accomplishment that
are common across cities and states. In short, the laws that apply to
long-term recovery programs, which include a range of local, state,
and federal laws, and the institutions needed to implement them, make
up an important part of a city's effective long-term recovery from
disaster.9
delivering funding to the "20,000 homeowners who [had] applied for help rebuilding their
homes").
26. See Heather Haddon, Rejections for Sandy Grants Are Questioned WALL STREET
J., http://wsj.com/articles/SBI 0001424052702303496804599765431674359994 (last updated
Feb. 5, 2014, 9:26 PM). A public interest law group analyzed appeals from denials of long-
term recovery assistance funds by the contractor hired by the State of New Jersey who
processed recovery grant applications from homeowners affected by Hurricane Sandy. Id
The analysis asserted that the contractor may have improperly rejected up to 80% of the
appealed homeowner applications. Id
27. See National Disaster Resilience Competion, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING & URB. DEV.
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=2014ndrc-nofa.pdf
(urging potential applicants that "when federal, state, local and philanthropic goals align,
community capacity and innovation can leapfrog forward").
28. See sources cited supra notes 23-26.
29. See Gavin Smith et al., Assessing State Policy Linking Disaster Recovery, Smart
Growth, and Resilience in Vermont Following Tropical Storm Irene, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 66,
70, 76 (2013) (referring to the role of laws as "resource rules"); David A. Super, Against
Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1375, 1428-32, 1441-47, 1452-56 (2011). Super noted the
ability of federal and local governments to predict and anticipate critical stress events, such as
natural disasters, and stressed the importance of early, proactive lawmaking and decision
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This Article calls for development of a tool that would succinctly
evaluate the range of governmental community capacities that are
critical for implementing long-term disaster recovery efforts by states,
the federal government, and/or nonprofit and philanthropic leaders."
Much like the widely popular annual college rating index published by
U.S. News and World Report," the index would identify a group of
capacities critical to long-term recovery, measure a city's track record
for exercising that capacity, and ultimately combine the several
capacity scores to allow for a comparative overall ranking of cities.
This Index, the City Resilience Index (CRI), would be deployed to
gauge the comparative capacity of cities to carry out the community
and neighborhood redevelopment activities essential to successful
long-term recovery. On completion of the CRI, the goal would be for
this assessment tool to provide the state and federal government, as
well as interested citizens and philanthropic and nonprofit
stakeholders, with a "snapshot" of a local government's resiliency-its
capacity to rally and channel a city's resources to bounce back from
disaster and crisis.
At the outset of this Article, a word is necessary concerning the
CRI's scope. The city resilience bandwagon is now so long and wide
that it is populated by advocates for better architectural design and
building codes,3" improved ecosystem management3 and family
health,34 and even better curricula and schools." That all of these
making on important policy questions, so as to avoid the mistakes and oversights that flow
from crisis decision making. Id at 1428-32. Super highlighted Hurricane Katrina as a tragic
illustration of local, state, and federal governments failing to put laws and plans in place to
address the likely risks and challenges associated with a major hurricane. Id. at 1428-65.
30. Although this Article focuses on governmental capacity to implement long-term
recovery strategies, the nature of long-term recovery requires close partnerships between
governmental and nongovernmental organizations. As development of the CRI continues, it
will be expanded to include several indicators that focus more closely on the presence, or not,
of nongovernmental capacities, such as the local capacity for nonprofit housing development
organizations to build housing at scale.
31. See Robert Morse et al., How US. News Calculated the 2016 Best Colleges
Rankngs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 8, 2015, 9:36 PM), http://www.usnews.com/
education/best-colleges/articles/how-us-news-calculated-the-rankings.
32. See Alan Feuer, Buildng for the Next Big Storm, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 25, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/nyregion/after-hurricane-sandy-new-york-rebuilds-for-
the-future.html?_r=0 (discussing the American Institute of Architects' "Post-Sandy Initiative"
report).
33. See, e.g., Rupert Seidl, The Shape of Ecosystem Management To Come.
Anticipating Risks andFostering Resilience, 64 BIOSCIENCE 1159(2014).
34. See, e.g., Amber Lazarus, Relationships Among Indicators of Child and Family
Resilience andAdjustment Following the September 11, 2001 Tgedy 12-13 (Emory Ctr. for
Myth & Ritual in Am. Life, Working Paper No. 36, 2004).
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interests have a voice in shaping the resilience paradigm is an
encouraging sign. In this current stage of development, however, the
CRI focuses narrowly on housing and community development.
The CRI considers factors that deal almost entirely with the
"bricks and mortar" of city neighborhoods. It attempts to identify
factors that are critical to neighborhood development. It is concerned
with how a city best sustains and rebuilds neighborhoods. Some will
say that this focus is nearsighted, insofar as it appears to focus more on
"recovery" than on the important values of rebuilding "greener" or
more sustainably It is true the CRI could have a much broader scope.
As Jeffrey Hebert, Executive Director of the New Orleans
Redevelopment Authority offers, resilience discussions could easily
encompass far more than the built environment-related work of his city
redevelopment agency.7 Resilience planning, he notes, should include
fundamental considerations such as the success of a city's school
district. 38
There is no arguing that there are many critical concerns that
need to be integrated into any comprehensive approach to building and
rebuilding cities. But this sad fact is certain: at the current juncture,
federal, state, and local governments are combining to do a lackluster
job of simply helping cities recover when they are pummeled by
disaster or crisis.39 If a city cannot do the basic work of recovery with
reasonable speed and efficiency, then the local government is
effectively denying recovery to thousands of families who cannot
return home to their old neighborhood or to some new, safer, more
affordable location in their home city." Enabling the city to regain
35. See, e.g., Resilience in Practice: School-Based Child Care as a Resilience-
Building Tool for Adolescent Mothers and Their Children, RESILIENCE ADvOC. PROJECT 1
(Mar. 2011), http://resiliencelaw.org/wordpress2O11/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/PolicyBrief.
ChildCareandResilience.March2Ol1 I.FINAL_.pdf.
36. See The Coming Storm: Has Resilience Eclipsed Sustainability as a Core Design
Concept, ARCHITECT MAG. (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.architectmagazine.com/architects/
the-coming-stormo.aspx.
37. Interview with Jeffrey Hebert, Exec. Dir., New Orleans Redevelopment Auth., in
New Orleans, La. (Aug. 4,2014).
38. See id.
39. See Marshall, supra note 5 (detailing slow federal, state, and local implementa-
tion of post-Katrina long-term recovery programs in New Orleans); Fosset, supra note 17
(highlighting a pattern of poorly coordinated federal and state implementation of long-term
recovery programs beginning with 9/11 long-term recovery, extending through Hurricane
Katrina, and continuing through to the Sandy long-term recovery).
40. See Buettner & Chen, supra note 25 (reporting that New York City's long delay in
delivering federal recovery funds to residents caused many to "give[] up"). Out of 20,000
homeowners who applied for aid under the City's "Build It Back" program, "[n]early 900
formally withdrew their applications, and another 5,130 stopped responding to calls from the
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population or to execute plans to redevelop or repurpose
neighborhoods following a disaster or crisis is critical and goes to the
core of a city's resilience."
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes what an index
is and how it works. Part Il introduces the specific idea of the CRI. It
looks at the local governmental legal landscape and identifies four
significant factors or index "indicators" relevant to a local
government's implementation of long-term recovery efforts. To that
end, Part III.A looks at three separate and important aspects of local
governmental institutions and the role they play within a local
government's legal landscape for redevelopment. Part IU.B looks at
local laws and policies and highlights the way in which one particular
class of laws-laws authorizing local governments to exercise eminent
domain-tend to be instrumental in facilitating long-term urban
recovery initiatives.
II. THE CRI AS A PREVENTIVE METROPOLITAN POLICY FOR
AMERICAN CITIES
A. An Index Is a Potentially Valuable Tool for Improving Long- Term
Urban Recovery
In the wake of disaster, a city faces challenges in rebuilding
homes, schools, and libraries; repaving its streets; and helping reopenits shopping centers. Any one of these tasks is an enormous
undertaking. But the number and breadth of redevelopment projects
are not the only challenges the local government must face. Disaster
and crisis also highlight the inadequacy of government institutions and
the shortcomings of existing law.43
housing recovery office." Id.; accordMarshall, supranote 5, at 101-03, 118 (explaining how,
in the context of the recovery from Hurricane Katrina, "[I]ong-term recovery delayed can be a
recovery denied for residents of storm-ravaged neighborhoods").
41. See Dorcas R. Gilmore & Diane M. Standaert, EdItors'Introduction to BUILDING
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE POST-DISASTER, supm note 20, at xxvii, xxvii-xxviii.
42. See Feuer, supm note 32 (describing New York City's long-term recovery
undertakings as "enormous, comprising the construction of sea walls and bulkheads, beach
replenishment, the creation of parks as buffer zones, the retrofitting of apartment buildings,
commercial structures and single-family homes, and the redesign of power stations, subway
tunnels, sewage treatment plants, hospitals, utility poles and even ordinary streets").
43. See DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK & LISA GROW SUN,
DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 345-64, 369-90 (2d ed. 2010). The basic legal and institutional
challenges associated with recovery include devising interim financing vehicles to furnish
local governments with money to spend on long-term recovery projects as required for some
federal assistance and creating "legal capability" and "institutional capacity" to enact and
pursue disaster mitigation policies and programs, such as engineering projects, hazard
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It is difficult to predict exactly the type of physical and human
casualties a city may suffer due to crisis or disaster." Based on stories
surrounding recent urban crises and catastrophic disasters, it is
possible to highlight potential legal pitfalls and institutional
impediments that undermine long-term recovery efforts. But
anecdotes relating to outdated laws or the lack of necessary local
governmental institutions have limited value. Unfortunately, there is
no analytical framework or checklist to help cities evaluate how the
presence or the absence of certain laws or institutions impact cities'
capacity to rebuild.
The purpose of the CRI is threefold. The CRI is intended to
create an analytical framework to evaluate the laws and institutions that
could aid cities in completing vital postdisaster housing and
community development work. It also provides a system for
measuring how laws and institutions contribute toward advancing
housing and community development goals as well as facilitating
comparisons among cities and states. In addition, the CRI makes it
possible to track cities' progress toward resilience over time.
The CRI is a potentially valuable tool because it can help
accomplish a range of important objectives, including more responsive
and transparent governance and improved public policy to help foster
more successful long-term recovery efforts."5 Local, state, and federal
avoidance projects, and environmental preservation projects. Id at 345-64; see DANIEL A.
FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 248-72 (2006). Farber
and Chen discussed the wide range of legal and institutional problems that cities must address
during long-term recovery: assembling land for redevelopment and the local government's
authority or political will to use eminent domain; rebuilding thousands of units of housing;
and the need for land use and zoning changes, such as inclusionary zoning, which help ensure
that new housing options include homes affordable to low- and moderate-income families.
Id.; see also Victor B. Flatt & Jeffrey J. Stys, Long Term Recovery in Disaster Response and
the Role of Non-Proits, 3 ORATI Socio-LEGAL SERIES 346, 360 (2013), http://opo.iisj.
net/index.php/osls/article/view/153/195 (detailing the current shortcomings in law and
institutions evidenced by recent large-scale disasters and asserting the need for "federal and
state disaster planning and response laws and regulations [to] provide a legal and regulatory
mechanism for effective coordination of roles, responsibilities, and funding, as well as pre-
disaster planning").
44. See Fossett, supra note 17 (acknowledging that improving federal, state, and local
coordination of long-term recovery efforts is challenging because "no two severe weather
events are alike," but urging that the missteps associated with the 9/11, Katrina, and Sandy
recoveries suggest numerous opportunities to improve long-term recovery coordination and
streamlining).
45. Although no other indices focus specifically on the role that laws and institutions
play in promoting urban resiliency, more general indices serve as similar instruments to
evaluate legal institutions, processes, and outcomes. See, e.g., Mark David Agrast et al., Rule
of Law Index 2012-2013, WORLD JUST. PRoJEcT (2012-2013), http://worldjusticeproject.
org/sites/default/files/WJPIndexReport_2012.pdf. There are numerous nonlegal indices
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governments, as well as philanthropic, nonprofit, and for-profit
entities, can use the CRI to inform and spur important changes in law
and policy long before disasters strike or the full impact of climate
change unfolds. " If a city's important stakeholder entities can make
informed predictions about a local government's challenges and
competencies for implementing long-term recovery programs, then
they can help push or guide policy in more productive directions." At
the same time, to the extent indices provide citizens with focused
information about a local government's resilience or lack thereof, the
CRI can be used as a tool for citizens to evaluate whether their local
government is taking responsible steps to improve a community's
resiliency.48
that focus on topics broadly related to city resilience, including the Economic Security Index,
which measures Americans' level of economic security. Eg., Jacob S. Hacker et al.,
Economic Security at Risk: Findings from the Economic Security Index, EcoN. SECURrry
INDEX (July 2010), http://www.economicsecurityindex.org/upload/media/EconomicSecurity-
Index Full Report.pdf The Economic Security Index measures the share of Americans who
are particularly vulnerable economically because they have suffered "at least a 25 percent
decline in their inflation-adjusted 'available household income."' Id at i. Further, the
Commitment to Development Index measures how and whether "government policies help or
hurt poorer nations." David Roodman, Building and Running an Effective Policy Index:
Lessons from the Commimtent to Development Index, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV. 1 (Mar. 13,
2006), http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/661 fileEssay_2.pdf
46. Scholars note that one of the most important steps state and local governments
can take is to plan for long-term recovery before a crisis or disaster occurs. See Smith et al.,
supra note 29, at 97 (emphasizing the importance of pre-event capacity building). An index
is an important tool to help prompt cities to invest resources in predisaster long-term recovery
planning.
47. See Katrin Bennhold, Britain Mmnistry of Nudges, N.Y TtMES (Dec. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/business/international/britains-ministry-of-nudges.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (illustrating generally how governments can use nonlegal or regulatory
interventions to "change behavior in large ways that serve both individuals and society").
48. See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant
Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012). Indices have become increasingly popular as tools for
helping consumers make informed choices. As part of a movement toward "focused
transparency" local, state, and federal governments have created guides that furnish
consumers with highly relevant, but limited, information regarding the choices they may be
making in purchasing goods or services or even an interest in real property. Restaurant
"report cards," for example, have proliferated in cities across the country as a means of
informing consumers about a restaurant's sanitary conditions. Id at 582. Their purpose is
not only to encourage restaurant compliance with sanitary codes but also to serve consumers'
interests in avoiding restaurants that pose food-poisoning risks. Id Thus, the report card
fuses policy goals with consumer goals. Id at 582-83.
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B. Selecting Indicatois for Building an Effective Ciy Resiience
Index
Generally speaking, an index works like a report card.4 1 It distills
data into succinct quantified or measured values or values concerning
key capabilities or vulnerabilities." The index may then take one or
more quantified values and create a composite ranking or rating.'
For example, an index could be devoted to a policy concern, such
as evaluating the financial services that banks offer to low- and
moderate-income communities. 2 Within that selected policy area, the
index identifies certain goals, proficiencies, or characteristics deemed
significant to that particular policy area. For instance, a financial
services index focusing on low- and moderate-income families might
reasonably conclude that the number of bank branches that financial
institutions operate within low- and moderate-income neighborhoods
constitutes a significant data point." This type of measurement of
relevant investments, characteristics, or proficiencies would be
considered one of the index's indicators.
An index can draw its indicators from a range of sources, such as
sources evaluating an organization's processes for providing certain
49. See Morse et al., supra note 31.
50. See, e.g., Sundermann et al., supra note 16, at 6-9 (analyzing relevant data to
produce quantitative measurements regarding (1) the population negatively impacted by a
range of natural hazards as well as (2) the local and countrywide economic losses associated
with the anticipated negative impact on that population and, in turn, using these two
indicators to rank and order relative threats to 616 cities worldwide).
51. See, e.g., US. Local Governments General Obligation Ratings. Methodology
andAssumptions, STANDARD & POOR'S (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.standardandpoors.com/
spf/upload/EventsUS/USPFjlogo02014.pdf Standard and Poor's (S&P) maintains an
index to gauge the relative creditworthiness of more than 4,000 U.S. local governments. See
id. at 6. The index rating is determined through an evaluation of the following five general
"factors" or indicators: the local government's institutional framework, economy, manage-
ment, financial measures, and debt and contingent liabilities. Id. at 4-5, 10. Each of these
five factors is weighed separately according to S&P's established standard for that factor's
relevant importance. See id. at 5, 10. For example, the "economy" factor is weighted to
account for 30% of the overall rating, whereas the local government's institutional framework
makes up just 10% of the overall rating. Id. at 5, 10. S&P's rating for a local government
may then be further modified by consideration of certain positive "overriding factors" and
negative "overriding factors." See id at 5, 11.
52. See Raymond H. Brescia & Sonia Steinway, Scoring the Banks., Building a
Behaviorally Informed Community Impact Report Card for Financial Institutions, 18
FORDHAM J. COR. & FIN. L. 339, 339-43, 361-63 (2013) (describing the formulation and
implementation of the Community Impact Report Card (CIRC), which was created to give
"communities across the country [the ability] to shape and improve the behavior of the banks
that serve them by offering consumers an easy means to assess the quality of the bank
products and services available to them").
53. See id. at 340, 368-69.
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services. 4 An index examining banks' services to low- and moderate-
income communities might import indicators directly from the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act's (HMiDA) categories of required
information that banks must report regarding their provision of
mortgage lending services." Similarly, a restaurant grading index
might focus on compliance with sanitary guidelines, such as the FDA's
model food code." In short, if an index tracks an organization's
success at complying with established codes or guidelines, the index
indicators can be drawn directly from the applicable regulatory
provisions."
The CRI focuses on laws and public agencies or institutions that
influence a city's housing and community development programs.
More specifically, this initial version of the CRI focuses on
characteristic types of state and local laws and institutions. There are
no federal regulatory templates, such as HMDA, that enumerate local
and state laws or institutions that are directly adaptable to the CRI's
purposes. However, there are certain types of laws and institutions
common across jurisdictions that help provide a framework for
identifying issues concerning the capacity to engage in housing and
community development work.
Selecting index indicators is just one step in creating the index.
Another purpose of an index is to measure an organization's success at
completing tasks, meeting standards, or engaging in activities that the
index judges critical to achieving the desired policy result. 8
Measurement is only possible where each index indicator is
54. In addition to evaluating processes, local governments could also be assessed on
structural characteristics of local governance, such as the local government's organizational
structure, or outcomes of local government programs, such as the effects of city programs on
neighborhood residents. Cf Avedis Donabedian, The Quality of Care: How Can It Be
Assessed 260 JAMA 1743, 1745 (1988) (explaining that structure, process, and outcomes
are three important factors for evaluating the quality of healthcare services).
55. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2012). CIRC uses financial institutions' responses
to the HMDA reporting requirements to evaluate the performance of financial institutions
under the Index's "home loan category." Brescia & Steinway, supm note 52, at 367.
56. See Ho, supra note 48, at 638.
57. See id.; Brescia & Steinway, supm note 52, at 367.
58. See Liesel Ashley Ritchie & Duane A. Gill, The Role of Community Capitals in
Disaster Recovery 4 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Ritchie and
Gill explained that while it is relatively easy to measure index indicators for a community's
"financial" and "built" capital, it is much more challenging to measure factors such as a
community's "social, political and cultural capital." Id. They urged that even though the data
that may be used to measure these types of capital is harder to identify and collect, this
"methodological challenge[] cannot be an excuse for researchers to ignore critical elements of
recovery processes." Id.
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differentiated in a meaningful way. 9 The most basic type of
differentiation might be a binary "yes" or "no" measurement. For
example, in the bank rating index context, if the indicator is whether
bank branches in lower-income neighborhoods have at least one
branch employee that speaks Spanish, the indicator would be measured
in a binary manner: "yes" for the presence of a Spanish-speaking bank
teller and "no" for the absence of such an employee.'
Part 1I1 outlines the proposed metrics for measuring the several
CRI indicators suggested in this Article and discusses each CRI
indicator.
C The City Resilience Index as 'Noice"and 'Nudge"
Restaurant report cards and similar consumer disclosure indices
are often aimed at providing notice to target groups of consumers or
citizens and gently encouraging or "nudging" individuals toward safer,
smarter, and more efficient choices.' In turn, by prodding individuals
in a certain direction, the index also serves the purpose of incentivizing
targeted businesses (e.g., restaurants) toward compliance with
regulatory standards.6
2
The goal of the CRI is broader in scope. The CRI informs not
only the private citizens about local governments' effective
administration or implementation of policy but similarly informs their
federal, state, and nonprofit partners.63 Its purpose is not to inform
state, federal, and philanthropic actors' decisions to work, or not, with
59. See Patrick S. Romano & Ryan Mutter, The Evolving Science of Quality
Measurement for Hospitals. Implications for Studies of Competition and Consolidation, 4
INT'L . HEALTH CARE FIN. & EcoN. 131, 131-32 (2004). This Article represents an initial
step in the process of choosing the best indicators or factors for the CRI to track. Index
indicators are the particular variables that provide the most relevant and useful information in
studying the topic of local government administration of long-term recovery programs. This
early iteration of the CRI does not attempt to identify all of the possible indicators that would
be helpful in assessing a local government's resilience or preparedness for long-term recovery
from crisis or disaster. That is the CRI's ultimate goal. We are thus mindful of the fact that
the indicators or factors highlighted in this Article may need to be further refined and/or
expanded. See id. at 131 (explaining that using indicators or factors to examine important
policy questions is challenging because the problem at hand likely has "multiple dimensions,
[or] organizations that perform well on one dimension [but] may not perform well on others"
and concluding that "[iut is all too easy to arrive at the wrong conclusion if one focuses on a
single measure, or even on multiple measures of a single dimension").
60. See Brescia & Steinway, supra note 52, at 369.
61. See Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IowA L. REv. 773, 783-84, 787
(2014); Bennhold, supra note 47.
62. SeeHo, supra note 48, at 582.
63. See, e.g., Agrast et al., supra note 45, at 3 (providing "information for policy
makers, businesses, non-governmental organizations, and other constituencies").
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a particular city. Rather, the CRI seeks to help those partners quickly
understand a jurisdiction's functional ability to implement long-term
recovery programs, ranging from rebuilding public facilities to
redeveloping entire neighborhoods.
A well-tuned car is often described as "running on all cylinders."
Its engine is efficiently producing the power to propel the car forward.
The resilience index should help a city's stakeholders determine how
efficiently a city's housing and community development "engine" is
working. Imagine that a city's resilience is measured with a type of
dashboard gauge. That gauge ranges from very low resilience at one
end, indicated by an absence of government programs and capabilities
for promoting redevelopment. The middle of the gauge reflects a sort
of governmental sluggishness or indifference, where some of the
necessary laws and proficiencies are in place but many are lacking. At
the optimal far end of the gauge, cities' laws and policies are designed
and used to respond efficiently and effectively to a community's
existing and potential needs and demands. The CRI aims not only to
read the "gauge" in order to determine how efficiently a city deploys
its housing and community development programs but also to help
cities "move the needle" toward greater effectiveness and efficiency.'
This forward progress, or "engine tuning" occurs when city
government, local businesses, philanthropic entities, and state and
local governments receive information that shows how a local
government is operating suboptimally, suggesting that the city is
especially vulnerable to stresses such as natural disasters or economic
downturns. In short, the goal of the CRI, as with similar indices, is to
look prospectively, seeking to improve future outcomes for
communities."
At the end of the day, a city resilience index is a pragmatic and
incremental tool that can nudge local governments toward better
policy." It is not a tool that tries to reshape the mechanics of the
federal-state-local housing and community development system.
64. It is also an important object of the CRI to promote an active and ongoing
discussion about cities' efforts to promote resilience. This function of index as facilitator of
discussion is a clearly stated object of some indexing projects. See Soumitra Dutta et al., The
Global Innovation Index 2014" Nurturing New Sources of Growth by Developing the Human
Factor in Innovation, in THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2014: THE HUMAN FACTOR IN
INNOVATION 3, 41 (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2014), https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/
userfiles/fide/reportpdf/GI-2014-v5.pdf ("The [index] helps to create an environment in
which innovation factors are under continual evaluation... .
65. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 48, at 643.
66. See Sanford Levinson, Meliorism v "'Bomb-Throwing"as Techniques ofReform,
48 TULSA L. RE. 477, 488 (2013).
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Rather, it helps coax local governments from "here" to "there"--from
the status quo (or worse) to a place where local governments are better
prepared to do the housing and community development work
necessary during times of adversity.67
In this respect, the index serves four purposes: (1) it helps to
define a common grammar and vocabulary regarding legal and
institutional obstacles and catalysts to neighborhood recovery;68 (2) it
gives credit to local governments doing a good job and identifies those
local governments that need to do better; (3) it helps to identify
strategic investment opportunities for nonprofit, philanthropic, and
government agencies so that, when disaster comes, the needs of
disproportionately impacted low-income families can be addressed;
and (4) it places a pressing policy problem on a local or state
government's "radar screen." 9 If a city scores low on the city resilience
index, this score will likely catch the attention of a local elected
official in a more urgent way.7°
D The Challenge ofEstablishing Metrics for Measuring the Positive
and Negative Impacts ofHousing and Communiy Development
Laws
A city resilience index faces at least two challenges. The first
challenge is that, by definition, the index examines U.S. cities' success,
relative to one another, at implementing housing and community
development programs. Although housing and community develop-
ment policies represent just a narrow segment of a local government's
broad program of services, 1 the index's mission is broad because it
applies to dozens of local government jurisdictions. This requires data
on state and local laws to be collected broadly.
The second challenge is that laws are not generally susceptible to
quantitative assessment. In establishing the CRI, our challenge, and
also our charge, is to identify metrics that accurately capture the
vitality of a city's housing and community development programs and
systems. To do this, we must, as Dan Esty urges, "measure what
67. Heather K. Gerken, In Praise ofRankings, 19 WIDENER L.J. 1, 3 (2009).
68. See id. at 5.
69. Heather Gerken calls this "flag[ging] policymaking priorities." Id. at 16.
70. See id.
71. View any city government's homepage listing of its major departments, and it is
evident that local governments are responsible for providing a broad range of services,
including aviation, finance, fire, police, parks and recreation, planning and community
development, public works, and watershed management. See, e.g., Departments, Crrv
ATLANTA, GA., http://www.atlantaga.gov/index.aspx?page=19 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
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matters."7 This task is relatively clear-cut when creating an
environmental quality index.73 This kind of index can use information
disclosed to government agencies regarding emissions of chemicals. 4
It is possible, therefore, to ground an environmental quality index on
precisely measured factors, such as the level of particulates emitted by
nearby industry into a city's air."
It is not as straightforward, however, to assign a numeric value to
the influence that a law has on long-term recovery."6 This is an
important consideration because we want to base our index on
indicators that provide meaningful information to cities, citizens,
businesses, government agencies, and philanthropies. An index aims
to provide a certain degree of transparency to otherwise opaque policy
concerns. 8 If the index is based on indicators that do not accurately
reflect a city's resilience, then the index would be of little use to third
parties and counterproductive for the city.79 Our goal in taking these
72. Gerken, supm note 67, at 10. Gerken was quoting Dan Esty, an author of the
Environmental Performance Index. See Daniel C. Esty et al., 2008 Environmental
Performance Index, YALE U. 2 (June 16, 2008), http://www.yale.edu/epi/files/2008EPI-
Text.pdf.
73. See, eg, How Scorecard Works, SCORECARD, http://scorecard.goodguide.com/
about/txt/technology.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). Scorecard is an online rating system
that draws on more than 400 data sets to compile geographically specific information and
rankings on environmental pollution according to zip code. See id
74. See Frequently Asked Questions, SCORECARD, http://scorecard.goodguide.com/
about/txt/FAQS.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). Scorecard's rankings and information on
pollution levels are gathered from "publicly available data on polluters collected by federal
regulatory agencies." Id. Scorecard does not currently draw data on pollution sources from
state or local databases. Id
75. See, e.g., About Scorecarg SCORECARD, http://scorecard.goodguide.com/about/
about.tcl (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
76. See, e.g., Agrast et al., supra note 45, at 3-4. Although the Rule of Law Index is
described as "a diagnostic tool that provides a general assessment of the health of the rule of
law," the Index evaluates countries' laws based on surveys of citizens and scholars regarding
how the laws are applied. See id at 4; see also Inga T Winkler, Margaret L. Satterthwaite &
Catarina de Albuquerque, Treasuring What We Measure and Measuring What We Treasure:
Post-2015 Monitoring for the Promotion of Equality in the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
Sector, 32 WIS. INT'L L.J. 547, 547-51, 558-59 (2014) (cautioning that while indices provide
powerful motivation for governments and nongovernmental organizations to act because
index "[n]umbers are perceived to be professional, rational, credible, and neutral," they can
do so at the sacrifice of important policy considerations such as "quality, accountability and
participation").
77. See Ho, supra note 48, at 655.
78. See, e.g., US. Local Governments General Obligation Ratings: Methodology
andAssumptions, supra note 51, at 3, 14 (explaining that S&P issued its 2013 ratings update,
in part, to ensure that investors could benefit from additional transparency regarding how
S&P sets its local government ratings-ratings that are in part based on local governments'
perceived institutional transparency).
79. See Ho, supra note 48, at 655.
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first steps toward building the CRI is to choose indicators and devise
metrics that give people accurate and meaningful information."
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR REDEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
DIRECTLY INFLUENCES LONG-TERM RECOVERY OUTCOMES
The CRI is devoted to analyzing the general topic of housing and
community development. When fully developed, the CRI may be
divided into several housing and community development
subcategories.8'
The author focuses here on one of those community development
subcategories: the Legal Landscape for Redevelopment Activities
subcategory. This subcategory assesses potential external obstacles to,
and assets for, housing development programs. 2  "Housing
development strategies are also dictated by numerous state and local
laws as well as the existence-or not-of active state, local, non-
profit, and philanthropic institutions." 3 Any of these factors can enrich
or dampen a city's development climate.
In this preliminary outline of the CRI's housing category, the
author provides three examples of CRI indicators that help measure the
important influence of the surrounding legal environment on a resilient
housing sector.
80. See id at 657.
81. See Romano & Mutter, supra note 59, at 131-32.
82. Another possible housing and community development subcategory might focus
on the measures that a local government can deploy to accomplish housing and community
development objectives. One measure might include comprehensive planning tools, leading
to a subcategory that might be called "Local Government Housing Development Legal
'Toolbox': Planning." John Travis Marshall & Ryan Max Rowberry, Urban Wreckage and
Resiliency: Articulating a Practical Framework for Preserving, Reconstructing, andBwlding
Cities, 50 IDAHo L. REv. 49, 61-68 (2014).
83. Id. at 63 n.59.
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Table A
Examples of Index Categories, Subcategoies, and Indicator?
Policy Subcategory Indicator
Category
Housing and Local Government Ability to Implement Federal
Community Legal Landscape: Community Development Block Grant
Development Institutions Programs
Local Government Ability to Pursue Redevelopment
Legal Landscape: Objectives with Federal, State, and
Institutions Private Entities
Local Government Existence of, and Capacity of, Land
Legal Landscape: Banks and Vacant Property
Institutions Management Entities
Local Government State Prohibitions Against Use of
Legal Landscape: Eminent Domain for Redevelopment
Laws and Policies
A. Institutions Subcategory-Identifying Institutional Capacity To
Successfully Manage Long-Term Recovery
Major disasters leave cities in shambles.85 In the course of a day,
a disaster can destroy critical city resources that were decades in the
making: its parks network, its street lights, its storm drains, its
commercial shopping amenities, and its affordable homeownership
stock.86 Fixing these enormous losses is an overwhelming challenge
for any city. It must proactively seek detailed citizen input on
rebuilding efforts. 7 It must formulate a plan describing the hundreds
of projects necessary to address the storm-related losses." It must
84. In preparing this preliminary table of resilient city index categories and
indicators, the author has been influenced by a template supplied by the Environmental
Performance Index (EPI). SeeEsty et al., supm note 72, at 19-2 1.
85. See KEVIN Fox GOTHAM & MIRIAM GREENBERG, CRISIS CIms: DISASTER AND
REDEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK AND NEW ORLEANS 58-62 (2014) (recounting the 9/11
attacks, including both the loss of life when the hijacked planes took down the World Trade
Center and the economic destruction unleashed when 300,000 New Yorkers subsequently lost
their jobs, as well as the historic losses incurred four years later in New Orleans, where
almost 50% of the city's metropolitan area homes were flooded).
86. See id.; see also Raymond H. Brescia, Elizabeth A. Kelly & John Travis Marshall,
Cisis Management Principles that Should Guide the Disposition of Federally Owned
Foreclosed Properties, 45 IND. L. REv. 305, 328-29 (2012) (discussing the devastation caused
by Hurricane Katrina).
87. See OLSHANSKY & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 39-188 (describing in detail in
their definitive analysis of New Orleans' post-Katrina planning process, the multistage
planning process required to fashion a plan that would secure federal funding for New
Orleans' long-term recovery).
88. E.g., the City of New York Communiy Development Block Grant-Disaster
Recovery: PartialAction PlanA, CITY N.Y 8, 138 (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/
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procure dozens of private contractors and oversee the administration
and implementation of hundreds of contracts.89 It must adopt and
implement thorough accounting procedures to track accurately the
expenditure of every dollar of grant funds expended."
A city's capacity to implement successful long-term disaster
recovery also depends, in part, on whether it possesses local
government institutions that can formulate and manage a broad range
of housing, community, and economic development projects. Very
few cities would have the annual budget to create and maintain large
and sophisticated public sector housing and redevelopment agencies-
either in-house as a city department or operated as an autonomous
outside governmental authority, such as a redevelopment authority or
housing authority. But as a part of a city's assessment of its resilience,
a city should evaluate whether and how its existing departments or
agencies can assume the significant responsibilities of redevelopment
should crisis or disaster strike.
It is unlikely that a local government can lead the arduous
neighborhood rebuilding process without preexisting proficiency in
nurturing and revitalizing neighborhoods.9" In other words, a local
government must possess the institutional capacity to successfully
manage long-term recovery. That institutional capacity is demon-
strated in a number of ways. Among the most important indicators of
a local government's capacity, two are critical competencies: (1) the
cdbg/downloads/pdf/cdbg-drfull.pdf (laying out the details of New York City's comprehen-
sive plan for spending federal disaster CDBG funds for long-term recovery projects,
including house repairs and infrastructure projects); see OLSHANSKY & JOHNSON, supM note
13, at 39-188.
89. See, e.g., Buettner & Chen, supra note 25. Twenty thousand residents applied for
assistance from the City of New York's Build It Back home reconstruction and repair
program. Id. The City retained contractors to perform the home repair work, Boston
Consulting Group (BCG) to assist in designing the program, other contractors to administer
the program, Public Financial Management (PFM) to oversee the program's entire operation,
and URS Corporation as a subcontractor to operate the program's intake centers. Id.
90. See, e.g., Memorandum from Nikita N. Irons, Reg'l Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., to Cheryl Breaux, Dir., Cmty. Planning & Dev., U.S. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev. 6-10, 14-15 (Apr. 8, 2011) (on file with author). The Regional Inspector General
censured the Redevelopment Authority for its failure to exercise proper control over its
neighborhood stabilization programs: the Authority "[d]id [n]ot [a]dequately [fjulfill NSP 2
[r]equirements [b]efore [a]uthorizing [p]ayment to [i]ts [redevelopment] [p]artner[s]," the
agency failed to "establish an internal audit function," the Authority failed to ensure that its
consortium members followed required federal procurement regulations, the agency failed to
follow strict programmatic budgets, and it failed to implement an adequate cost allocation
plan for its redevelopment programs. Id.
91. See Rose & Tuggle, supm note 6, at 2-4 (describing the City of New Orleans'
failure to support effective housing programs prior to Hurricane Katrina).
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ability to serve its most vulnerable citizens by competently utilizing
public resources earmarked for housing and community development
programs benefitting low- and moderate-income families and (2) the
ability to deliver housing and community development programs to the
greatest number of residents quickly and efficiently by leveraging the
resources of state, local, nonprofit, philanthropic, and private sector
entities.
1. Institutions-An Essential Aspect of Institutional Capacity Is a
Local Government's Ability To Implement Housing and
Community Development Block Grant Programs at Volume
Local governments generally budget funds annually to support
housing and community development projects benefitting the city's
low- and moderate-income families.92 Federal block grant dollars in
the form of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG)93 or
HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) 4 funds ordinarily
constitute a significant share of those local housing and community
development funds." Even in an era of generally sluggish direct
92. See, e.g., Office of Cmty. Dev., Draft 2014 Annual Action Plan, CITY NEW
ORLEANS 2, 33 (June 16, 2014), http://www.nola.gov/getattachment/Community-Develop
ment/2014-Draft-Annual-Action-Plan-(F).pdf/ (describing the City of New Orleans' plan for
spending HUD "formula" grants).
93. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 established CDBG, a
HUD program, to support development of housing and community development projects
benefitting low- and moderate-income families. See Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-
5321 (2012)); see also John D. Landis & Kirk McClure, Rethinking Federal Housing Policy,
76 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 319, 321-24, 343 (2010) (situating the CDBG program in the overall
landscape of federal housing policy).
94. Like the CDBG program, Congress authorized the HOME program to help low-
and moderate-income families. The HOME program was created under Title II of the
Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990. See Home Investment
Partnership Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, §§ 201-29, 104 Stat. 4079,4094-4128 (1990) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12721-12840 (2012)); see also Landis & McClure, supra note 93,
at 321-24, 340-42 (situating the HOME program in the overall landscape of federal housing
policy).
95. See Jan R Mensz, Note, Citizen Police: Using the Qui Tam Provision of the False
Claims Act To Promote Racial and Economic Integration in Housing, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1137, 1157-58 (2010) (stating that CDBG funding has a "widespread and
sometimes substantial impact on municipal budgets"). Following a disaster, HUD funds
make up the vast majority of a local government's housing and redevelopment budget. See
Bruno & Tervalon LLP, New Orleans Redevelopment Authorty Financial & Compliance
Audit Together with Independent Auditors' Report for the Year Ended December 31, 2013,
LA. LEGIS. AuDrOR 11 (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.lla.state.la.us/PublicReports.nsf/B435404
714D02B9086257D94006860B0/$File/00003B97.pdf (documenting that HUD funds,
including CDBG and Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 funds, pumped more than $24
million into the Redevelopment Authority's 2013 outlays of $25,149,199.00).
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federal investment in low- and moderate-income housing and
community development projects,96 these federal block grant funds
usually fill critical gaps in project funding. 7 Although a local
government may, as a matter of law, spend these federal block grant
moneys beyond the particular year for which they have been allocated,
this delay means that a city's low- and moderate-income families are
not receiving the full measure of aid earmarked for them in a timely
fashion. 8
Slow deployment of block grant funds could occur for a number
of reasons, but among them is a local government's lack of aptitude for
using these types of funds." This kind of ineptitude raises significant
concerns for long-term disaster recovery efforts.
Federal block grant dollars are the principal vehicle for delivering
long-term recovery assistance to local governments impacted by
disasters."° For this reason, the housing and community development
category of a city resilience index should include at least one indicator
evaluating a local government's institutional ability to timely identify,
manage, and complete federal block grant funded housing and
community development projects.
As one of its institutional capacity metrics, the CRI proposes
measuring a local government's relative success at deploying its annual
allocation of federal block funds within one and two years of federal
allocation. This metric is obtained by dividing the amount of federal
96. See Cushing N. Dolbeare, Irene Basloe Saraf & Sheila Crowley, Changing
Pnoities: The Fedeml Budget and Housing Assistance 1976-2005, NAT'L Low INCOME
HOUSING COALITON 4 graph 1 (Oct. 2004), http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/cp04.pdf
(illustrating that while federal housing-related tax credits and expenditures for all housing
have skyrocketed since 1976, federal outlays for low- and moderate-income housing
increased only modestly and plateaued in the first decade of the twenty-first century); see
also Landis & McClure, supra note 93, at 323-48 (describing the federal government's
general scaling back of initiatives to aid construction of low- and moderate-income housing
beginning in the 1970s).
97. See Edward J. Sullivan & Karin Power, Coming Affordable Housing Challenges
for Municipalities Aflter the Great Recessio; 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 297, 308 & n.84
(2012).
98. See Memorandum from Tracey Carney, Acting Reg'l Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Hous. & Urban Dev., to Scott G. Davis, Dir., Disaster Recovery & Special Issues Div., U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. 2, 4, 12 (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.hud.gov/offices/oig/reports/
files/igl0al005.pdf (criticizing the State of Louisiana and the City of New Orleans for not
ensuring that federal block grant funds were spent in a timely manner and stating that this
failure "delay[ed] the City's recovery from the damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita").
99. See Rose & Tuggle, supm note 6, at 2-4 (noting that, prior to Hurricane Katrina,
the City of New Orleans' track record for spending federal resources lacked strategic
coordination).
100. See OLSHANSKY & JOHNSON, supr note 13, at 49-51.
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block grant funds spent for the year in question by the total amount of
federal block grant funds allocated for that specific year.
It is critical for the CRI's Housing and Community Development
Policy Category to include an indicator highlighting a local
government's capacity for investing those grant funds in eligible
projects on a timely basis. This capacity supplies one valuable
indicator of whether the local government knows how to take
necessary steps to deploy funding for essential long-term recovery
projects.'0'
2. Institutions-Institutional Capacity for Creating Partnerships To
Deliver Programs to Citizens in Need
It is essential that a local government have the capacity to
establish and maintain intergovernmental and extragovernmental
relationships that support and advance critical neighborhood
redevelopment objectives. It is also critical for local governments to
satisfy federal auditors by complying with voluminous technical
requirements associated with deploying federal grant funds.' 2 To do
otherwise is to jeopardize the continued flow of recovery funds. 3 But
experience or skill at handling federal redevelopment funds, while
necessary to support dynamic neighborhood revitalization, is not by
itself sufficient to carry out successful long-term recovery projects. "
101. One of the important ways of evaluating the efficacy of government programs is
measuring outcomes. Cf Donabedian, supra note 54, at 1745 (explaining that outcomes are
among the most important factors for evaluating the quality of healthcare services).
Evaluating a local government's success at spending CDBG funds, which are the main source
of funds for long-term community recovery, provides a meaningful assessment of a local
government's capacity to perform long-term recovery because it provides an easily
quantifiable and comparable outcome measurement for local governments.
102. A local government's failure to comply with federal regulations applicable to the
use of federal block grant funds can result in the Inspector General's recommendation that the
offending agency refund grant moneys to the United States Treasury or that unspent funds be
taken away from the agency. See, e.g., Memorandum from Gerald R. Kirkland, Reg'l
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., to Dan Rodriguez, Dir., Office of Pub.
Hous., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. 11, 13-14 (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.hudoig.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/audit-reports//igl 161005.pdf (recommending that the Port
Arthur Housing Authority be required to return a $725,546 allocation to the U.S. Treasury for
failure to follow applicable regulations, including more than $67,640 already expended);
Memorandum from Nikita N. Irons to Cheryl Breaux, supra note 90, at 4, 6 (expressing
concerns that part of a HUD $29.7 million award to the Redevelopment Authority was "at
risk" due to the fact that "[t]he Authority did not always use its NSP 2 funds in accordance
with Federal regulations").
103. See sources cited supra note 102.
104. In support of its Federal Action Plan describing how New York City would spend
more than $1.7 billion in Hurricane Sandy long-term recovery funds, the City highlighted its
"extensive experience in successfully managing the [annual federal] CDBG Entitlement
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A local government must be able to tackle a wide variety of
neighborhood rebuilding projects, ranging from residential repair and
reconstruction programs to commercial redevelopment initiatives,
parks renovations, public facility rehabilitation, hazard mitigation, and
green space projects.' 5 A local government cannot fund, much less
administer, all of these projects in a manner responsive to a city's
urgent needs on its own."
A second way the CRI could measure a local government's
institutional capacity for housing and community development
projects is by including an index indicator that examines the local
government's formal relationships with governmental and
nongovernmental entities. In normal, noncrisis situations, catalytic
urban redevelopment initiatives rarely mature guided solely by local
governments. '  Successful urban neighborhood revitalization is
ordinarily initiated and fueled by collaborations between and among
the local government, grassroots advocacy groups, state agencies,
federal agencies, nonprofit development firms, for-profit real estate
developers, and private foundations. 8
program;' including a thirty-nine-year track record and staff that "collectively has 214 years
of experience" administering the CDBG program. See The City of New York Community
Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery PartialAction Plan A, supra note 88, at 7-8,
138. The City's performance in delivering federal long-term recovery funds to displaced
families has been widely criticized as slow and poorly executed. See Mara Gay, Erica Orden
& Ricardo Kaulessar, Two Years Later, Sandy Wrath Still Felt WALL STREET J. (Oct. 29,
2014, 8:46 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/two-years-sandys-wrath-still-felt- 1414630016.
105. See, e.g., The City of New York Commutiy Development Block Grant-
Disaster Recovery Partial Action Plan A, supra note 88, at 30-31 (proposing to allocate
federal recovery funds to housing ($720 million); business recovery ($325 million);
infrastructure, such as public hospitals, schools, and beaches, as well as city services,
including demolition, debris removal, and code enforcement ($400 million); and projects to
incentivize future resilience ($327 million)).
106. See Liz Robbins, Afier the Storm, 20 Months in Limbo, N.Y TIMES (June 20,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/nyregion/after-the-storm-20-months-in-limbo.
html?_r=0. The article quoted a leader in Brooklyn's long-term recovery effort, Rev. Craig
Miller: "Common sense says there's not enough federal money to do it all .... In terms of
expediency, the work of the voluntary sector is critical, and crucial to a good recovery." Id.
107. See Anchor Institutions & Urban Economic Development.- From Community
Benefitt to Shared Value, INITIATIVE FOR COMPETITIVE INNER CITY 2, 9 (June 2011),
http://www.icic.org/ee-uploads/publications/ICIC-RESEARCH-anchor-insitutions-r2.pdf
(observing that one of the common urban redevelopment paradigms involves urban "anchor[]
[institutions being] repeatedly called upon by government and non-profit organizations to
support multiple community needs" and urging that this paradigm needs to change to one
where "anchors, governments, nonprofits and local businesses ... work together" in order
"[t]o create maximum shared value in inner cities").
108. See, e.g., Alan Greenblatt, From Vacant to Vibrant Cincinnati Urban
Transformation, GOVERNING MAG. (Sept. 2014), http://www.goveming.com/topics/urban/
gov-cincinnati-urban-transformation.html (describing the public-private partnership that
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Under such noncrisis circumstances, potentially transformative
redevelopment relationships can form, grow, and, in the best cases,
expand project by project.' °9 Catastrophic disasters or crises threaten a
city's fundamental well-being."'  Local governments, businesses,
nonprofits, and foundations are left to do their part in helping a city
pick up the pieces and rebuild."' Although a strong spirit of
cooperation often pervades the postdisaster landscape, this spirit would
be even stronger if those redevelopment relationships predated the
disaster or crisis.
In the wake of a disaster, a local government confronted with the
challenge of navigating a long-term neighborhood recovery initiative is
in a better position if it has proven redevelopment partners."2 Without
a network of these partnerships, a local government faces the dual
challenges of overhauling its operations to deploy long-term recovery
programs and developing trusting and the working relationships with
nonprofits necessary to help facilitate neighborhood recovery."3 Add
sparked and led the redevelopment of Cincinnati's formerly blighted and high-crime Over-
the-Rhine neighborhood).
109. Promoting partnerships between cities and their local nonprofit and philanthropic
stakeholders is a key object of the federal Strong Cities, Strong Communities Initiative. See
White House Council on Strong Cities, Strong Cmtys., Strong Cities, Strong Communities
Iriative: IstAnnual Repo U.S. DEP'T HoUSING & URB. DEv. 16-17 (Apr. 2013), http://
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=SC2AnnualReport.pdf. Nurturing existing
government-nonprofit partnerships and creating new partnerships is considered a key to
expanding the effective reach of governmental urban revitalization programs. See id at 18-
20.
110. In the immediate wake of Hurricane Katrina, public dialogue reached the
fundamental question of whether New Orleans should be rebuilt. This question was raised by
then Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Dennis Hastert, as well as
commentators. See Jack Shafer, Don't Refloat: The Case Against Rebuilding the Sunken
City of New Orleans, SLATE MAG. (Sept. 7, 2005, 3:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news-and.politics/pressibox/2005/09/dontrefloat.html; Jill Zuckman, Hastert Tries To
MendRif' over Words, Cn. TRm. (Sept. 3, 2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-09-
03/news/05090302 10_1_house-speaker-dennis-hastert-kathleen-blanco-relief-efforts.
111. See Memorandum from Flozell Daniels & Albert Ruesga to Melody Barnes,
supra note 15, at 2-6 (describing the critical post-Katrina rebuilding roles played by residents,
community groups, and nonprofit and philanthropic organizations).
112. See Flatt & Stys, supra note 43, at 356 ("[P]ost-disaster communities that have an
existing coordination mechanism for non-profit organizations are generally better equipped to
design and implement a long term recovery response."); see also Rose & Tuggle, supra note
6, at 1-7, 10 (recounting New Orleans as a city largely lacking housing and community
development capacity prior to Hurricane Katrina due to misuse of resources, poor planning,
graft, and low-capacity private sector partners and describing the post-Katrina flourishing of
outside investment paired with energized local capacity for housing and community
development projects).
113. See Flatt & Stys, supra note 43, at 356 (describing the conflict that sometimes
characterizes local government interactions with nonprofits when the two parties lack
predisaster relationships).
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to these two challenges the fact that in a postdisaster landscape, key
public and private sector decision makers are, on the one hand,
channeling their energies to address immediate urgent needs and, on
the other hand, focusing, literally, on rebuilding city hall as well as
their family homes."' In short, the exigencies of a postdisaster
recovery environment make it challenging for local governments to
leverage effective partnerships with nonprofits, thus leaving
neighborhoods to begin the rebuilding process with little local
governmental support and guidance."'
Disaster recovery scholars use the concepts of "horizontal
integration" and "vertical integration" to assess a local government's
strategic connections for deploying effective solutions to problems."6
The value of this analytical framework is that it acknowledges that
local governments do not, and cannot, solve major housing and
community development problems in a vacuum. A local government
is horizontally integrated if it can demonstrate working relationships
with other organizations occupying the local landscape, including
neighborhood organizations, local nonprofits, the local community
foundation, local businesses, and local educational institutions.
Vertical integration focuses on the existence, or not, of the local
government's connections with state and federal agencies, as well as
the city's relationship with regional or national nonprofits and
philanthropic funders.' The ability of a local government to form and
sustain relationships also suggests that the local government will be
114. See Eugenic L. Birch, Learning from Past Disasters, in REBUILDING URBAN
PLACES AFrER DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRJNA 132, 147 (Eugenie L. Birch &
Susan M. Wachter eds., 2006) (noting that in the months following Katrina, the City of New
Orleans' leaders were focused on the essential and basic realities of governance, including an
anticipated 50% drop in tax revenues and the related decision to terminate 3,000 city
employees).
115. See Memorandum from Flozell Daniels & Albert Ruesga to Melody Barnes,
supra note 15, at 2 (explaining that "residents and community groups ... have led much of
the progress that has occurred" in New Orleans, overcoming "ongoing challenges" including
"weak political infrastructure").
116. See, e.g., Smith et al., supm note 29, at 80.
117. According to S&P's local government rating system, vertical integration of local
governments in the U.S. is less important in evaluating the strength and stability of local
governments than it is abroad because local governments here generate so much of their own
operational funding through local taxation. See US. Local Governments General Obligation
Ratings: Methodology andAssumptions, supra note 51, at 5-7. However, in times of disaster
or crisis, the importance of the federal-local and state-local relationship is critical because
local governments largely lose their ability to generate local tax revenue-if even
temporarily-and must rely on enormous infusions of federal and state funds to fund the
community's recovery from disaster. See Birch, supra note 114, at 147 (describing the City
of New Orleans' municipal funding crisis following Hurricane Katrina).
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able to rally its resources and develop integrated homegrown solutions
to long-term recovery challenges. This ability is sometimes described
as a city's ability to "self-organize" in response to crisis."8 The term
"self-organize" is defined as the capacity not just to adapt to adverse
circumstances but to devise responses with lesser reliance on outside
resources and influences."9
The horizontal and vertical integration framework yields
important insights about whether a local government possesses
meaningful connections-connections that help it navigate regulatory
obstacles, gather accurate information about local conditions, and
disseminate that information in a manner that can bring in additional
resources to target the toughest challenges.' A city's resilient recovery
is greatly influenced by a local government's formal relationships with
outside private and public entities.2 ' The CRI employs the horizontal
and vertical integration framework to help evaluate whether a local
government has existing relationships that during a long-term recovery
will give the local government the capacity to communicate and
partner with organizations critical to identifying, planning, and
implementing housing and community development projects.
The CRI would award credit to local governments for two types
of current formal relationships with entities involved in housing and
community development matters. By current relationships, we mean
relationships active within the year preceding preparation of the CRI's
most recent iteration.
The first category of current formal relationships includes
housing and community development agreements that have a
monetary measure of value, either in terms of money that a city
intends to pay or loan to a third party or an agreement under which a
third party is granting or lending money in exchange for certain
services or programs to be provided by the city. Examples of these
agreements might include:
An agreement with a nonprofit housing developer to rehabilitate
low-income housing units;
118. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Resilient Cities and Adaptive Law, 50
IDAHO L. REV. 245, 249 (2014).
119. See id.
120. See Smith et al., supra note 29, at 80.
121. See Kalma Rose, Bringing New Orleans Home: Communiy Faith, and
Nonprofit-Dniven Housing Recovery, in RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE
U.S. GULF COASTAFTER KATRINAAND RITA 99, 100-02, 113-14 (Amy Liu et al. eds., 2011).
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* An agreement with local attorneys to serve as outside counsel to
support the city's code enforcement or eminent domain programs
for assembling vacant properties; or
* A local community foundation's program-related investment
(PRI) in a city's neighborhood redevelopment initiative.
The CRI would give credit for these housing and community
development contracts relative to the dollar value of the contract. A
critical consideration for cities when entering into contracts with third
parties is whether the proposed agreements would trigger local, state,
122
or federal procurement requirements.' 23 Local and state procurement
laws are triggered at varying amounts. Federal procurement
requirements applicable to HUD grantees attach to any contracts above
$100,000.00.2' Thus, the CRI would award credits as follows:
1 point for a contract up to $99,999 that triggers local or state
procurement or public bid law requirements;
2 points for a contract worth greater than $100,000.00 (which
triggers federal procurement requirements); or
3 points for a contract worth more than $1,000,0000.00
The second category of current formal relationships for which the
CRI would give credit are agreements without specific monetary
value. Sometimes in-kind or interagency services are accorded no
value or given nominal value. Further, a city may enter into a general
agreement to coordinate and cooperate as a predicate to the investment
of local government resources or to investments in local government
programs. Examples of these agreements include:
" A cooperative-endeavor agreement (CEA) representing an
agreement between a local government and regional or state
governmental entities for technical assistance or the combination
of efforts or resources to accomplish a shared objective;
" A memorandum of understanding (MOU) that memorializes a
city's commitment to helping a neighborhood solve a specific
problem, such as abandoned properties; or
122. Like other states, the State of Louisiana has enacted a statute governing certain
types of state procurement. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 39:1551-:1755 (2015).
123. Federal agencies and the state and local grantees of HUD must comply with
federal procurement regulations. See Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles,
and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, 2 C.ER. pt. 200 (2015).
124. See 24 C.FR. § 84.84(e)(5)(ii) (2015).
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A consortium agreement that confirms a city's commitment to
working with a group of public or private entities to achieve a
common objective, such as neighborhood redevelopment.
The CRI would award credit for agreements that have no specific
monetary value as follows:
1 point for agreements signed by the local government's chief
executive or, if the local government's redevelopment efforts are
administered by a redevelopment authority or other local agency,
by the chair of the agency's board.
To provide the most accurate possible picture of a local
government's capacity, the CRI must not only consider positive
indicators of capacity, but also negative indicators of capacity. It is
relatively easy to track factors that tend to suggest a local government's
diminished capacity to manage housing and community development
programs. Just as a local government might gain points for the type of
constructive positive relationships that suggest its capacity for carrying
out housing and community development projects, so too should the
Index track negative indicators that would call for points to be
subtracted from an Index score.
125
Thus, the CRI also includes an indicator that tracks the ways in
which local governments operate that may tend to impede relationships
with governmental and nongovernmental organizations. In other
words, the CRI also measures the presence of factors that detract from
a local government's ability to form and maintain vertical and
horizontal relationships.
A city's long-term recovery from disaster or crisis is characterized
by an extended period of significant stress and adversity. Staff
resources are stretched to cover far more substantive responsibilities
than prior to the disaster. The local government's mandate for carrying
out long-term recovery is generally underfumded because there is never
enough money to address all of a city's neighborhoods' needs. If a
local government operates at an inadequate level of efficiency prior to
125. Adequate data and computer information systems are critical to the smooth and
effective operation of any essential government unit, particularly when disaster or crisis
strike. The State of Louisiana's auditors issued an audit, reprimanding the New Orleans
Redevelopment Authority, an independent state agency, for relying on the information
systems of another government entity, the City of New Orleans, without any written
agreement memorializing this relationship between the two entities. See Bruno & Tervalon
LLP, supm note 95, at 115.
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a disaster, these predisaster deficiencies suggest the likelihood of
significant problems for postdisaster implementation of housing and
community development initiatives.
Further, it would be a mistake to conclude that local government
dysfunction is the only sign for concern. Indeed, a potential "red flag"
should be raised if a city has operated its housing and community
development programs for more than a year without an audit. The lack
of a current audit is a warning sign that no one has looked under the
local government's "hood" to see how well its housing agency,
redevelopment authority, or community development department is
running.26 If sound practices cannot be confirmed prior to a disaster,
then potential federal, state, and private and nonprofit partners should
presume that a local government may encounter basic problems in
implementing solutions for a postdisaster long-term recovery situation.
Importantly, the CRI tracks negative indicators of local
government functionality. Examples of these negative factors that
indicate breakdowns in basic local government functionality include:
* Audit findings: If a local government has difficulty properly
managing its basic programs prior to a disaster or crisis event,
this is a possible sign that it will falter under conditions of
significantly greater adversity, such as during a long-term
recovery. Further, a local government that lacks internal controls,
policies, and procedures faces steep challenges to functioning as
an effective redevelopment partner for state, federal, nonprofit, or
for-profit entities; or
* Failure to promptly pay contract obligations: This failure
suggests that (1)they will have problems meeting other basic
contract obligations or that (2) they are partnering with agencies
that are slow at furnishing reimbursement or funding-neither
result being good. It is one thing for a government agency to pay
invoices slowly; it is another for the agency to be sued because of
i.127it.,
126. See, e.g., id at 1-5.
127. See Michelle Krupa, Companies that Helped NO Getting Paid 2 Years Later,
NOLA.CoM, http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2008/03/companies that helpedLno-getti.
html (last updated Oct. 12, 2009, 11:22 PM); Pub. Strategies Grp., City ofNew Orleans: A
Tnansformation Plan for City Governmen4 CrrY NEw ORLEANS 2, 6, 8, 19 (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://www.nola.gov/chief-administrative-office/documents/nola transformation-plan/ ("New
Orleans ... has great trouble paying its bills on time. Solving that problem would improve
the city's image with the business and nonprofit community, while helping the city hire better
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Each of these indicators can be measured by reviewing the type
of yearly audit that should be conducted for any entity receiving
federal block grant funds.
3. Institutions-Land Banks as Essential Participants in Long-Term
Recovery.
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy devastated entire regions of the
country, leaving in their wake hundreds of neighborhoods with scores
of unoccupied and, in some cases, abandoned properties.'28 During the
same time period, the mortgage foreclosure crisis ravaged cities from
coast to coast.2 9 Although the storms dramatically altered landscapes
overnight and the mortgage crisis consumed neighborhoods slowly
and steadily, the long-term effects these catastrophes have had on
neighborhoods have been consistent in many important respects. For
neighborhoods caught in their paths, the hurricanes and the foreclosure
crisis have left block after block afflicted with burned-out residences,
overgrown lots, and homes owing thousands in unpaid property
taxes.
130
Dilapidated properties undermine neighborhood recovery by
discouraging new investment."' Comprehensive and transformative
long-term disaster recovery requires that local and state governments
and their redevelopment partners find a way to assemble and hold
damaged or dilapidated properties until they can be redeveloped or
contractors, faster (since many will not now compete for city work because the city pays so
slowly)").
128. See Sandy Keenan, Dark Water. A YearAhferHurricane Sandy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
2, 2013), http://nytimes.com/2013/10/03/garden/dark-water-a-year-after-hurricane-sandy.html
(reporting that nearly a year after Sandy, approximately one-quarter of Long Beach, New
York's residents had not yet returned); Michelle Krupa, New Orleans Neighborhoods that
Suffered Worst Flooding Lost Most Residents, Census Data Show, NOLA.COM (Feb. 6, 2011,
8:00 AM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/02/neworleans-neighborhoods_
that.html (explaining that Hurricane Katrina's flood waters pushed persistent blight beyond
"older neighborhoods west of the Industrial Canal [and into the city's newer] neighborhoods
such as Gentilly and Lakeview").
129. See Sage Computing, Inc., Revitalizing Foreclosed Properties with Land Banks,
HUD USER 1 (Aug. 2009), http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/1andbanks.pdf.
130. See Marsha Shuler, Lower 9th Ward Revitalization Plan To Go Before Voters,
NEW ORLEANS ADvoc. (June 3, 2014, 10:11 AM), http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/
news/9350879-171/ninth-ward-revitalization-goes-to (detailing a proposed amendment to the
Louisiana Constitution to allow the sale of 600 vacant and abandoned Lower Ninth Ward
properties at prices significantly below fair market value).
131. See Frank S. Alexander, Land Banking as Metropolitan Policy, SMART GROWTH
AM. 10-12 (Oct. 2008), http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/brookings-land-
banking.pdf.
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repurposed. 3 2 This has proven especially true in New Orleans, which
had a relatively weak housing market prestorm, with older housing in
poor condition. Katrina's flood waters made the situation even
worse. 33  Real estate development in New Orleans prestorm was
already challenging, but it became almost impossible following the
storm's widespread devastation."
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans' housing and
community landscape did not support an institution devoted to
comprehensive vacant property management and promotion of
equitable housing development. The absence of an institution
equipped to receive, hold, and transfer abandoned properties quickly
became an impediment to neighborhood recovery.'35 The City of New
Orleans and allied governmental agencies involved in the
redevelopment did not have a tool at their disposal to cushion the
hurricane-induced real estate market shock. Because the New Orleans
real estate market no longer functioned normally, it could no longer
absorb any abandoned properties. Thus, each new abandoned property
had a high likelihood of becoming a hazard to surrounding homes,
schools, and businesses and, further, a fiscal drag for the city-
requiring additional policing and upkeep but remitting no property
taxes. Precisely the same situation began to unfold across the country
132. See, e.g., New Orleans Redevelopment Auth., Transition Report 4-11 (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (outlining in detail the New Orleans
Redevelopment Authority's strategy for using federal funds to implement its several programs
through a strategic framework to counter blight and abandonment).
133. See Brescia, Kelly & Marshall, supra note 86, at 328-35 (discussing the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans' real estate market).
134. See id. at 328-33 (detailing New Orleans Redevelopment Authority's strategy for
New Orleans' weak, intermediate, and stronger market neighbor-hoods); see also Louisiana
Land Trust, Louisiana Land Trust Property Redevelopment-$52.3 Million in CDBG
Allocated to New Orleans 1 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) ("Currently,
developers who have responded to [New Orleans Redevelopment Authority] RFPs to
redevelop Louisiana Land Trust (LLT) properties are largely stalled, unable to get product
from concept to construction.").
135. Laying the foundation for the government institutions necessary to navigate
fundamental threats to public health and safety is at least in part a local government duty. The
City of New Orleans failed to plan strategically for the fundamental need to manage vacant
and abandoned properties following a catastrophic storm event, even though the city faced a
major vacant property crisis prior to Hurricane Katrina. See Frank S. Alexander, Louisiana
LandReform M the Storms'Aftermath, 53 LoY. L. REv. 727, 729, 739 (2007) (explaining the
city's need for a land bank authority both before and after the 2005 hurricane); see also Super,
supra note 29, at 1443-46 (noting that "disasters sharply reduce agencies' capacity to make
and implement decisions" and observing that "review of federal, state and local planning
efforts before Hurricane Katrina shows both a broad awareness of the specific problems that
would arise and a maddening refusal to invest decisional resources in pro-active planning").
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beginning in 2005 as the historic wave of foreclosures began to roll
across cities and regions. '36
The housing and community development category of a city
resilience index should include at least one indicator for evaluating
whether a city or surrounding region supports a land bank or
institution with comparable powers for acquiring, maintaining, and
disposing of abandoned properties. The CRI would award credit to a
city based on the sophistication of the land bank. The CRI could give
nominal credit (1 point) to a city or region where the state and local
governments have passed the requisite state and local laws to create a
land bank authority. An intermediate level of credit (2 points) could be
given to land banks that have successfully accepted "deposits" of
properties during the last calendar year and also successfully conveyed
properties.'37 A higher level of Index credit could be given to land
banks that have conveyed properties-at a volume-to support
affordable housing development (3 points). '38 The highest level of
credit (4 points) could be reserved for cities and regions that support
land banks, which include all of the preceding characteristics and, in
addition, function on a regional basis by encompassing an entire
county or parish.
There are three reasons why it is critical for the CRI's housing
category to include an institutions indicator that includes land banks.
First, in "worst case" scenarios where major disasters or real estate
market crashes derail local or regional real estate markets, a land bank
can help absorb the abandoned properties that are the casualties of
disaster and crisis. Land banks serve as resources for holding and
maintaining properties when market conditions are so unfavorable that
no prospective or near-term development opportunities exist. "' Under
most circumstances, however, land banks could do much more than
serve as a real estate market "emergency room." Local governments
can partner with land banks to help them pursue short-, mid-, and
136. See Sage Computing, Inc., supm note 129, at 1; Alexander, supm note 131, at 10-
12.
137. The Index could award points for land banks that acquire properties through two
or more sources, including "(i) tax delinquencies and tax foreclosures; (ii) excess residential
real estate foreclosures; (iii) nuisance abatement lien enforcement; (iv) direct market
purchases; and (v) 'deposits' by third parties of properties to be held pending redevelopment"
and, at the same time, successfully transfer banked properties for redevelopment. Alexander,
supa note 131, at 25.
138. Cf Rose, supa note 121, at 99, 102 (reflecting that New Orleans lacked critical
"community development sector" assets, such as housing trust funds and community land
trusts, before Katrina).
139. Alexander, supranote 131, at 6-7.
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long-term redevelopment strategies. The second key function served
by land banks is as a resource for holding properties in order to address
a wide range of possible future local priorities, including holding
properties for redevelopment as parks, hazard mitigation features, or
urban agriculture.'0 But land banks are perhaps best suited to serve
the fundamental goal of affordable housing development. Thus, the
third reason that land banks should figure critically in the CRI is that
land banks have historically been viewed as critical partners in the
effort to build affordable housing and, in appropriate cases, market rate
housing.'
B. Laws and Policies Subcategory-An Indicator for Problems
Posed by State ProhibitionsAgainst Using Eminent Domain
Of all the various government actors, state supreme courts and
state legislatures may play the greatest role in dictating the success, or
not, of long-term disaster recovery efforts.'42 Fundamental differences
exist among states with regard to the laws applicable to housing and
neighborhood development. One of the principal legal powers for
comprehensive urban redevelopment is the state statutory and
constitutional provisions authorizing local governments to take
blighted properties. Eminent domain is just one of several tools that
local governments might use to acquire blighted properties that are
storm-damaged or are abandoned casualties of foreclosure or neglect.
It is a tool that figures critically into almost any comprehensive
redevelopment strategy because it can resolve a range of
redevelopment obstacles, including blight and clouded title, and, if
state law permits, it grants local governments the power to acquire
nonblighted properties that may be critical to an area-wide
redevelopment plan. This is also why the CRI proposes eminent
domain as an important example of a key index indicator for
evaluating the state or local legal landscape and its impact on urban
redevelopment.
Katrina's thorough dismantling of New Orleans' housing stock
has been well documented. The storm surge overpowered the city's
140. See id. at 7.
141. Seeid.
142. Cf Kathleen Tiemey, Remarks at the Third International Conference on Urban
Disaster Reduction (July 12, 2013). Tierney reflected that the "U.S. Supreme Court has a
huge role in disaster recovery policy as it interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution," which set limitations on government takings of private property for
public purposes. Id.
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deficient flood protection system, flooding nearly the entire city and
drowning 66,609 homeownership housing units in the process-a
staggering 76% of the city's homeownership housing units.'43 In
addition, the levee failures inundated more than 50% of the city's
rental housing stock.'" Katrina destroyed block after block of these
homes in a matter of hours.
45
By any measure, the physical destruction that New Orleans
suffered was catastrophic. But what made the destruction more
devastating was that many of the flooded neighborhoods were down-
and-out long before the storm.4 6  Decades of population loss, a
stagnant local economy, low-wage jobs, and poor schools had already
brought many New Orleans neighborhoods to their knees.4 7 Katrina
was a knockout punch. Bringing the storm-damaged neighborhoods
back would require not just money and a large team of nonprofit and
for-profit redevelopment firms. The effort required a range of legal
tools that local governmental agencies would need to employ to
acquire blighted properties, including a leading role for eminent
domain or, as it is called in Louisiana, expropriation.'"4
This plan was not to be. As Frank Alexander writes, before the
local government began using eminent domain to advance
neighborhood redevelopment, the Louisiana Legislature uninten-
tionally delivered another crippling blow to New Orleans' devastated
neighborhoods.'49  In response to the United States Supreme Court's
2005 decision in Kelo v City of New London,'" Louisiana joined a
number of states in limiting local governments' eminent domain
powers, including the power to take blighted property and redevelop
it.'5 ' At approximately the same moment, New Orleans shot to the top
143. The 2005 hurricane season damaged an astounding 66,609 of 87,589 owner-
occupied housing units in the City of New Orleans, which represents 76% of owner-occupied
housing units. See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. et al., Current Housing Unit Damage
Estimates. Hurrcanes Katina, Rita, and Wilma, GREATER NEW ORLEANS COMMuNITY DATA
CTR. 23, https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/KatrinaRitaWilma-Damage_-2 12
06 revised.pdf (last updated Apr. 7, 2006).
144. 153 CONG. REC. 16,634-35 (2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd on behalf of himself
and Sen. Landrieu).
145. SeeBRWNKLEY, supranote 1, at 131.
146. See Shafer, supra note 110.
147. Seeid; Krupa, supra note 128.
148. SeeLA. REv. STAT. § 19:2 (2014).
149. See Alexander, supra note 135, at 729.
150. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
151. See 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since
Kelo, CASTLE COALMON, http://castlecoalition.org/50-state-report-card (last visited Oct. 14,
2015); Five Years After Kelo: The Sweeping Backlash Against One of the Supreme Court
[Vol. 90:35
2015] RECOVER YFROM CRISIS AND DISASTER 71
of the nation's list of the most blighted cities, plagued by more than
100,000 blighted properties.'52 The timing could not have been worse.
The constitutional amendment adopted by the Louisiana legislature in
2006 arguably barred local governments from taking blighted
properties and from attempting to eliminate the blight by transferring
them to third-party private or nonprofit development firms.' While
eminent domain may not have been the silver bullet for solving New
Orleans' blight problems, the new constitutional amendment cast
serious doubt on the legal viability of what may have been the city's
most effective antiblight tool.'
Louisiana voters ultimately amended the state constitution in
November 2010 to give New Orleans the power to use eminent domain
to eliminate blight by transferring dilapidated properties to nonprofit
and for-profit development firms. 5 However, more than four years
had passed since the storm's landfall. The moment had long passed for
New Orleans to use expropriation as a catalytic neighborhood
redevelopment tool. This unfortunate chapter underscores a
consideration of bedrock importance to cities. If cities face crisis or
disaster, the first hurdle that they must clear is making sure they know
the implications of the legal obstacles that may be present in the face
of existing statutory or constitutional provisions.' This is the reason
why the housing category of a city resilience index should include at
Most-Despised Decisions, INST. FOR JUST. (June 2010), http://www.ij.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/08/kelo5yearann-white paper.pdf. According to the Institute for Justice, a nonprofit
organization that has advocated for limitations on state and local eminent domain power,
legislation seeking
[t]o comprehensively reform eminent domain ... should contain two essential
elements: It should ban "economic development" takings-using eminent domain
for the possibility of creating more tax revenue and jobs-while also changing so-
called "blight" laws to stop blight statutes from being used as a back-door method
of taking property for private development.
Id. at 3. The Institute adds: "Of the 43 states that changed their laws, at least 35 now do not
allow condemnations for economic development. And more than half of the 43 states (22
states) went even further by reforming their laws involving condemnations to supposedly
eliminate supposed 'blight."' Id
152. Jaquetta White, Blight in New Orleans Is Back to Pre-Katrina Levels, but
Challenges Remain, NEW ORLEANS ADvoc. (Aug. 25, 2015, 7:37 PM), http://www.thenew
orleansadvocate.com/news/12479530-172/blight-in-new-orleans-is.
153. See John J. Costonis, New Orleans, Katrina and Kelo: American Cities in the
Post-Kelo Era, 83 TUL. L. REV. 395, 406-07 (2008).
154. Seeid.
155. See Louisiana Expropiated Property, Amendment 8 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Louisiana-ExpropriatedProperty,-Amendment8_(2010) (last visited
Oct. 19, 2015).
156. SeeCostonis, supm note 153, at 413-14.
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least one indicator for evaluating whether the state constitutional or
statutory landscape poses significant impediments to a local govern-
ment's neighborhood and housing development goals.
The purpose of the CRI is to gauge factors that contribute to, or
detract from, a city's ability to carry out core housing and
redevelopment functions. The CRI would award credit to a city based
on the extent to which a state's statutes or constitution support the
city's ability to implement redevelopment initiatives. In other words, a
city receives more Index credits when the encompassing jurisdiction's
laws allow it to incorporate eminent domain in its redevelopment
strategy. A state in which cities cannot use eminent domain to take
blighted properties would receive zero credits.'57 A state where
eminent domain is permitted to take blighted properties, but where the
state has narrowed the definition of blight in such a manner that it
makes it difficult for cities to conduct blight-related takings at volume,
receives one credit.' For example, in a few states, local governments
are forbidden from taking a nonblighted property that sits amid
blighted structures.'59 Two credits are awarded to jurisdictions that
allow blight takings, but forbid or restrict transfer of those blighted
properties to private parties.'" Three points are awarded to states that
permit taking blighted properties and transferring them to private
parties for redevelopment without restrictions such as a requirement
that the local government hold the property for a period of years before
transferring it to a third party or a requirement that the local
government offer the blighted property back to its original owner
before conveying it to a private third party.
There are two reasons why it is critical for the CRI's housing and
community development category to include an indicator highlighting
the extent to which a state's constitution or statutes proscribes a local
government's power to take private property as part of its long-term
disaster recovery. The first is that a jurisdiction cannot afford to wait
until after a disaster or crisis to sort through the obstacles posed by a
city's inability to take blighted private properties and redevelop them
157. In response to the Kelo decision, Florida and New Mexico passed laws that
effectively eliminated a city's ability to take blighted properties using eminent domain. See
id at 415. Costonis refers to this drastic step as the "nuclear option" because it destroyed the
local government's power to take blighted properties. Id
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with the aid of nonprofit and for-profit corporations.'"' It took
Louisiana more than four years to address the impediments to
redevelopment caused by the state's 2006 amendments. By that time,
the city's blighted housing stock had festered for five years following
Katrina and thousands of residents had not returned to their empty
neighborhoods. If it suspects a possible problem with using this
power, a jurisdiction should identify the problem as early as possible
and move to correct it. Consider that in New Orleans, the problem was
not fully realized until 2009, when a Louisiana appellate court refused
to confirm that the constitutional amendment allowed takings and
transfers to third parties to eliminate blight.'62 The second reason is to
raise awareness that the more the public sector is restricted in its ability
to take blighted properties, the more private sector forces will be
hamstrung in their ability to participate in the redevelopment of
blighted properties. This is particularly true in lower-value
neighborhoods where the private market might not only encounter
difficulties, but where private actors may forgo any efforts to revitalize
blighted neighborhoods because of these challenges.' 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Disasters often recede from the nation's consciousness as
television and Internet news coverage wane, and glossy magazine
cover stories disappear from shopping market checkout lines. That is
understandable. We tend to be gripped and moved by images and
information that capture our attention. We are awestruck by video of
sailboats lying blocks inland from the shoreline or by photos of
buildings and bridges bent and shattered by seismic shocks.
Although the immediate postdisaster response phase represents a
critical stage in any disaster recovery story, it is still only an early
snapshot of a much longer journey. The long-term phase of that
journey is generally not so well documented. It is not easy to capture
people's imagination with stories of a city's legal or organizational
struggles to remake and reinvent in neighborhoods.
161. See Super, supm note 29, at 1443-46 (noting that "disasters sharply reduce
agencies' capacity to make and implement decisions" and observing that "review of federal,
state and local planning efforts before Hurricane Katrina shows both a broad awareness of the
specific problems that would arise and a maddening refusal to invest decisional resources in
pro-active planning").
162. See New Orleans Redevelopment Auth. v. Burgess, 2008-1020 (La. App. 4 Cir.
7/8/09); 16 So. 3d 569.
163. SeeCostonis, supm note 153, at 422-23.
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Report cards, ratings, and rankings, however, have a track record
of grabbing our attention. Whether concerning financial market
matters, such as Dow and NASDAQ, or a very personal matter, such as
a credit score, indices focus us on issues that might otherwise not
easily catch our attention. The CRI helps spotlight legal and
institutional obstacles to a city's long-term recovery.
No single index will capture every aspect of a robust urban
recovery or revitalization. But the CRI is an important tool that gives a
baseline understanding of the challenges that local communities and
their partners-federal, state, nonprofit, for-profit or philanthropic-
may face in helping a city recover from crisis or disaster.
